“Throughout the pandemic, US adversaries like China weaponized supply chain vulnerabilities in a way that threatened Americans’ health and security,” warned Rep. Mike Gallagher.
By Brad D. WilliamsThe trick will be to avoid “a situation in which China believes that it has no alternative but to act,” says RAND’s Michael Mazzar.
By Colin ClarkThe markup comes at a pivotal moment for the US as it intensifies competition — while seeking to avoid conflict — with China, in particular, which senior department officials refer to as the US’s “pacing threat.”
By Brad D. Williams“It’s part of a larger diplomatic strategy,” cyber policy expert James Lewis said of the US attribution to China for Microsoft Exchange hacks earlier this year.
By Brad D. Williams“The COVID-19 pandemic likewise taught the United States and our allies that adversaries, particularly China, are capable of weaponizing supply chain vulnerabilities to threaten our national security should they choose to,” the Task Force’s report says.
By Colin Clark“The PRC’s pattern of irresponsible behavior in cyberspace is inconsistent with its stated objective of being seen as a responsible leader in the world,” a senior administration official said on Sunday night.
By Brad D. WilliamsThe Exchange campaign attribution will also provide hints about the role of the first national cyber director in such incidents. NSA veteran Chris Inglis was confirmed for the position just weeks ago.
By Brad D. Williams“The J-35 may well represent another significant milestone in the Chinese long-term pursuit of a blue-water carrier based naval aviation capability”, said retired US naval intelligence officer, Capt. James Fanell.
By Reuben Johnson“We’re not in Kansas anymore,” Gen. Nakasone said about the cyber threat landscape and the US’s adversaries.
By Brad D. Williams“China is a second-tier cyber power but, given its growing industrial base in digital technology, it is the state best placed to join the US in the first tier,” an IISS report says.
By Brad D. Williams
The combination of a modern long-range bomber (the H-20), and an expanded seaborne ballistic missile force, as well as this massive inflation of the land-based ICBM component, makes China’s nuclear forces look far more like their “hegemonic” counterparts in Russia and the United States than the minimal or limited deterrent presented by French or British nuclear forces.
By Dean Cheng